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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 950350-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
CLINT DONALD YOUNG,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (f)
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital
felony.

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony of

a prior bad act into evidence under Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence?
"The admission of evidence under Rule 404 is a question of
law that we review for correctness.

However, the trial court's

subsidiary factual determinations should be given deference by
the appellate court and only be overruled if they are clearly
1

erroneous."

State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994)

(citations omitted).
This issue were preserved in a pre-trial motion (R. 33-38)
and by an oral objection at trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 169).
2.

Was Young denied the effective assistance of counsel:

One, because of trial counsel's failure to adamantly object at
trial to testimony of prior bad acts being admitted under Rule
404(b) without first considering the "prejudice" of such
testimony under Rule 4 03; and two, the result of trial counsel's
failure to request a limiting instruction from the trial court
pursuant to Rule 105 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
"Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on
direct appeal, this court can only determine that the defendant
was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do so as a
matter of law...If counsel's performance is clearly deficient,
but prejudice cannot be determined on the record before us,
remand is appropriate." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah
App. 1993); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App.
1993); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).
To establish ineffective counsel Young, therefore, must
show:

"(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in

some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial
would probably have been different but for counsel's error."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App.
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1989); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah App. 1989);
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 105/ Utah Rules of Evidence
When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for
another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall
restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly.

Rule 403# Utah Rules of Evidence (1995)
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (1995)
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Clint Donald Young appeals from his February 15, 1995,
second-degree felony conviction of forgery in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-6-501.

Specifically, Young appeals the trial

3

court's admission of evidence regarding a prior bad act under
Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition

On or about July 26, 1994, Appellant, Clint Donald Young,
was charged, by information, with one count of forgery (R. 18).
The Utah County Public Defenders Association was appointed to
represent Young.

A preliminary hearing was conducted in the

Fourth Circuit Court, Orem Department, on August 18, 1994, and
Young was bound-over to Fourth District Court (R. 14, 19, 181).
At an arraignment held on October 20, 1994, before the
Honorable Boyd L. Park, Young plead "not guilty" to the charge
and a jury trial was scheduled (R. 29-30) .
Prior to trial, Young filed a Motion and Memorandum to limit
evidence of prior bad acts under Rules 403-404 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence (R. 33-38) .

The State objected (R. 44-52) ; and the

trial court deferred its ruling until trial (R. 56). Also prior
to trial, Young requested new counsel and David Cundick, conflict
counsel for the Utah County Public Defenders Association, was
appointed as counsel (R. 57).
On February 15, 1995, a jury trial was held in the Fourth
District Judicial Court, the Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding (R.
153-56).

At the close of trial, Young was convicted by the jury

of one count of forgery in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 766-505 (Id.).

4

On April 6, 1995, Young was sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years and was
ordered to pay fines and restitution (R. 161-62, 182).
After sentencing, Young's trial counsel, David Cundick, was
allowed to withdraw as counsel and the Utah County Public
Defenders Association was appointed as appellate counsel (R. 16364, 167) .
This appeal followed, notice having been filed with the
Fourth District Court on May 3, 1995 (R. 172).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 1, 1994, a forged payroll check in the amount of
$396.69 was used to buy $177.40 worth of groceries at the
Albertson's market located on Center Street in Orem (R. 2/15/95
Tr. at 83-84, 87, 88, 113). The bearer of the check received the
remainder of the check, $219.29, in change from Albertson's
(2/15/95 Tr. at 113).
The check was drawn on the account of Circle A Outfitters at
the Draper Bank and was endorsed by two signatures from Circle A
Outfitters (2/15/95 Tr. at 83, 115-118).

The check was also

allegedly initialed by Jeff Southworth, a manager of the
Albertson's store in Orem (2/15/95 Tr. at 83-85, 86). One of the
endorsing signatures was that of John Norris, who with Roman
Murdock was originally authorized to sign checks from Circle A
Outfitters (2/15/95 Tr. at 118-119).
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Norris died in 1993, and

therefore, could not have signed the check (2/15/95 Tr. at 121,
135) .
Approximately one week later it was discovered that the
check was written on an account that had been closed since 1989,
and that the signatures endorsing the check, and the store
manager's initials had been forged (2/15/95 Tr. at 120).

The

signature of Norris, and the initials of the store manager
appeared to indicate that the person who presented the check had
inside knowledge of Circle A Outfitters and Albertson's (2/15/95
Tr. at 98-99, 173-174).

However, at trial, the prosecution

presented no evidence indicating that Young had such knowledge.
Two witnesses saw the person that presented the check.

The

first was the grocery checker, Barry Johnson, who cashed the
check.

Johnson testified that he was suspicious about the

validity of the check because it was computer generated on a dotmatrix printer and that he was reluctant to cash the check until
he saw that it appeared to have been initialed by a store
manager, who incidentally was not working at the time (2/15/95
Tr. at 86, 90-91, 98). Johnson asked for proof of identification
and was shown the driver's license of Clint D. Young (2/15/95 Tr.
at 91-92) .

Johnson matched the license number on the check,

which had been endorsed by "Clint Young," with that on Young's
driver's license (2/15/95 Tr. at 93, 94).
Johnson testified that he spent approximately five minutes
checking out the groceries of the person in question, and was
approximately three feet away from him during that time (2/15/95
6

Tr. at 95). Johnson also testified that the individual who
presented the check was wearing levi's, a blue tank top, and
cowboy boots, and that while the photo in the driver's license
had a beard, the person who presented the check did not (2/15/95
Tr. at 97, 101-102).
The other identifying witness was Albertson's store manager,
Greg Knighton, who was asked by Johnson to bring cash to his
check stand (2/15/95 Tr. at 105, 107). Knighton saw the
individual in question for a "couple" of minutes from a distance
of about 10 feet (2/15/95 Tr. 109-110).

Knighton's testimony

differs from Johnson's in that Knighton recalls the individual as
wearing a cowboy hat, as well as cowboy boots (2/15/95 Tr. at
110, 114). He also remembers the person as having a large
mustache or goatee (2/15/95 Tr. at 111, 114).
At trial Young and his father testified that Young has never
owned nor worn cowboy boots or a cowboy hat (2/15/95 Tr. at 192193, 217, 219) and that Young had lost his driver's license
almost a year prior to trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 193-194, 218-219).
Detective Gerald Nielsen of the Orem Department of Public
Safety was assigned to investigate the "check" on May 6, 1994,
after Albertson's had filed a police report (2/15/95 Tr. at 125).
He testified that he ran a check on the driver's license number
on the check, which turned out to be that of Clint Young; and
that he then obtained a copy of the license photo of Young
(2/15/95 Tr. at 125-127).
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Approximately two-three weeks after the check was cashed
Nielsen took the photograph to Albertson's and asked Johnson if
he recognized the individual (2/15/95 Tr. at 96-97, 128-129,
137).

According to Nielsen, Johnson identified the photo as the

man who presented the forged check (2/15/95 Tr. at 129).
However, Nielsen also admitted that it would have been better
policy to have shown the witness several pictures and have
Johnson point out the right one (2/15/95 Tr. at 138).
Nielsen testified that he submitted the check and samples of
Young's writing to Chuck Senn, a police expert on handwriting, to
determine if the endorsing signature on the check was the same as
the signature on Young's driver's license (2/15/95 Tr. at 129134) .
At trial Senn testified that it was "highly probable"--but
not positive--that the signature on the check and the signature
on the driver's license were written by the same individual
(2/15/95 Tr. at 140-161, 175-184, 189).
During trial, the State, pursuant to the trial court's pretrial order regarding the admission of evidence of prior bad
acts, asked the trial court for permission to call Holly Hales as
a witness for purposes of "identity" under Rule 4 04 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence (2/15/95 Tr. at 162-164).

Hales, who has known

Young since high school, had allegedly received a check from
Young written on the same Circle A Outfitters account as the
check at issue in this case (Id.).

The trial court, over Young's

objection, allowed Hales to testify under Rule 404 to show that
8

Young had the "opportunity" to possess checks from the Circle A
Outfitters Draper Bank account (2/15/95 Tr. at 174).
Hales testified that on May 20, 1994, Young, whom she had
known since childhood, presented a forged check to her at GGG
Foods in West Valley from the same account as the check presented
at Albertson's (2/15/95 Tr. at 202-207).

The modus operandi

differed in that in West Valley Young allegedly used a false
driver's license as identification, and the check was not made
out to Young nor did it contain the signature of anyone
authorized to write checks on the account (2/15/95 Tr. at 163,
201-208).
At the close of trial, Young was convicted by the jury of
one count of forgery in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6505 (2/15/95 Tr. at 264-267).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
One, Young argues that it was prejudicial error for the
trial court to admit Holly Hales' testimony of a prior criminal
acts for purposes of demonstrating "opportunity" under Rule
4 04(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence without considering whether
the probative value of her testimony was outweighed by its
prejudice to Young as required by Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Two, Young argues that he was denied his constitutional
right to counsel because of his trial counsel's erroneous and
prejudicial failure to argue, at trial, that the prejudicial
9

nature of Hales' testimony outweighed any probative value it
possessed under Rule 404(b).

Young also asserts that his trial

counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient because he
failed to request of the trial court a limiting instruction as to
the scope of the evidence of prior criminal behavior as mandated
by Rule 105 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
TESTIMONY OF PRIOR BAD ACTS UNDER RULE 404(b)
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 403.
Young asserts that the trial court committed error in
allowing Holly Hales to testify, over Young's objection, as to a
prior act of forgery at GGG Foods in West Valley committed by
Young.

At trial, Hales specifically testified that on May 20,

1994, Young, whom she had known since childhood, presented a
forged check to her at GGG Foods in West Valley from the same
account as the check presented at Albertson's (2/15/95 Tr. at
202-207) .
However, the modus operandi in the act Hales testified to
differed from the alleged Albertson's forgery.

At GGG Foods,

Young allegedly used a false driver's license as identification,
and the check was not made out to Young nor did it contain the
signature of anyone authorized to write checks on the account
(2/15/95 Tr. at 163, 201-208).
This Court has previously stated that reviewing the
admissibility of prior bad acts is a three-step process:
10

One, is

the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b)?
evidence meet the requirements of Rule 4 03?

Two, does the
Three, if the

requirements of either one or two have not been met, did
admission of the evidence amount to prejudicial error?

State v.

Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994).
A.

The trial court erred in admitting Hale's testimony
under Rule 404(b) without first considering its
admissibility under Rule 403.

Young asserts that the trial court erred in not balancing
the "probative value" of Hale's testimony to show "opportunity to
have these checks" (2/15/95 Tr. at 174) with its "unfair
prejudice" to Young as required by Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.1
1994).

See State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App.

Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded

if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
j ury...."
In relation to the issue of prejudice, this Court has
stated,
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to
influence the outcome of the trial by improper means or if
it appeals to the juries sympathies or arouses its sense of
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes
x

Young filed a pre-trial motion in limine with respect to
the admissibility of prior bad acts wherein he argued that "even
if the evidence meets the requirements of Rule 404(b), that
evidence must be excluded if it violates Rule 403 (R. 37). The
trial court deferred its ruling on Young's motion until trial and
concluded that "Defendant's Motion in Limine will be considered
at the time of trial, outside the presence of the jury and before
counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into areas covered by
rules 403, 404, and 609" (R. 56).
11

a jury to base its decision on something other than the
established propositions of the case.
State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied,
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).

Utah appellate courts have also

outlined several factors which must be considered when the
probativeness of evidence is balanced against its prejudicial
effect:
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof,
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.
State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994); State v.
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585
(Utah 1993); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988).
Young asserts that Hales' testimony, under the trial court's
ruling that such evidence was admissible only to show
"opportunity to have these checks", should have been limited,
under Rule 403, to testimony that Hales saw Young in possession
of a check from the same account as that used in the forgery
committed at Albertson's.
Young further asserts that it was error for the trial court
to allow Hales to testify that Young, whom she had known since
childhood, had committed forgery against her and GGG Foods using
a check from the same account as had been used in the Albertson's
forgery and that she had been fired as a result of her acceptance
of the bad check from Young (2/15/95 Tr. at 202-208) .

12

In

addition, Hales was allowed to testify that Young had even called
her after the incident to apologize (2/15/95 Tr. at 208).
The prejudice of this testimony clearly outweighs its
probative value under Rule 403.

It "influence[d] the outcome of

the trial" by showing that Young must have been the one who
committed the forgery at Albertson's because he committed the
forgery at GGG Foods.

It provoked the jury's "instinct to

punish" because it established that Young probably commits
forgeries on a regular basis.

And it caused "the jury to base

its decision on something other than the established propositions
of the case."
Therefore, Hales' testimony should have been limited to
establish "opportunity"--or alternatively "identity" as requested
by the State.

The trial court's failure to balance the

probativeness of the testimony under Rule 404(b) with the
prejudice its admissibility caused to Young as required by Rule
403 is clear error.2

In fact, the trial court even admitted that

Moreover, it was obvious error. If this Court finds that
Young's failure to renew his objection to admissibility of the
testimony under Rule 403 at trial constitutes waiver, this Court
should find that the trial court committed "plain error" in
failing to consider the requirements of Rule 403 prior to
admitting the testimony. See State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010
(Utah App. 1994), and conclude that the trial court's error was
both obvious and harmful.
Since 1988, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that
before evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) it must be
considered in light of the requirements of Rule 4 03 the trial
court's failure to conduct such an inquiry must be considered
"obvious" error. See State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah
1989); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); State
v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994);and State v.
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585
(Utah 1993) .
13

he should "probably stopped" the State on at least a couple of
questions asked of Hales (2/15/95 Tr. at 211) .
B.

The admission of Hale's testimony was prejudicial•

Young recognizes that, even if the testimony should not have
been admitted under Rule 403, he must still demonstrate that
admission of the evidence amount to prejudicial error.
Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994).

State v.

In further

clarification of the requirement of prejudice, this Court in
Olsen stated, "In determining whether an error is harmful, that
is, whether the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in the verdict, we look at 'a host
of factors, including ... the overall strength of the State's
case.'" State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994).
Young asserts that Hales' testimony significantly bolstered
the strength of the State's case.

Although without her testimony

both Johnson and Knighton testified that Young was the one who
cashed the check at Albertson's and Senn testified that it was
"highly probable" that the signature on the check matched the
signature on Young's driver's license, there were significant
difference's in the descriptions of Young offered by Knighton and
Johnson3 and Senn also testified that he couldn't be "positive"
The requirement of "harm" under the "plain error" standard
will be discussed infra.
3

Johnson testified that the individual who presented the
check was wearing levi's, a blue tank top, and cowboy boots, and
that while the photo in the driver's license had a beard, the
person who presented the check did not (2/15/95 Tr. at 97, 101102) .
Knighton, on the other hand, testified that Young was
14

that the check and driver's license were signed by the same
individual.
In addition, both Young and his father testified that Young
has never owned nor worn cowboy boots or a cowboy hat (2/15/95
Tr. at 192-193, 217, 219) and that Young had lost his driver's
license almost a year prior to trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 193-194,
218-219) . Moreover, Young testified that he had never been to
the Albertson's on Center Street in Orem nor had he ever written
a check on the Circle A Outfitters account at Albertson's
(2/15/95 Tr. at 214).
Young maintains that Hales' testimony is prejudicial and
must undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict because it
greatly strengthened the State's by showing that Young must have
been the one who committed the forgery at Albertson's because he
committed a somewhat similar forgery at GGG Foods.

It could have

also led the jury to believe that Young probably commits
forgeries on a regular basis; and it, likewise, caused "the jury
to base its decision on something other than the established
propositions of the case."
Accordingly, Young asks that this Court find that the trial
court committed reversible error with its failure to limit the
admissibility of Hales' testimony as required by Rule 403.

wearing a cowboy hat, as well as cowboy boots, and that he had a
large mustache or goatee (2/15/95 Tr. at 110, 111, 114).
15

POINT II
YOUNG WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In determining whether Defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel "this court cannot apply rigid mechanical
rules, but instead must focus 'on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged.'"

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2056 (1984); State
v. Snvder, 860 p.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993).
In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the
Defendant's burden to show:

(1) that his counsel rendered a

deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but
for counsel's error."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1089
(Utah App. 1989); State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).
As the Strickland two-prong test is being utilized, it should be
remembered that the right to effective counsel is a crucial
element of a criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the
focus of the review should be "on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged."

Strickland, 466

U.S. at 670, 104 S.Ct. at 2056; State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351,
354 (Utah App. 1993).

16

A.

Trial Counsel Rendered a Demonstrably Deficient
Performance

To satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Defendant
must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard or reasonableness, but the court is not to second-guess
trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices.

Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465;
Crestani, 707 P.2d at 1089.
If the requirements of Rule 403 in relation to the
admissibility of evidence under Rule 404 must have been obvious
to the trial court, it likewise should have been obvious to trial
counsel.

Although Young's initial trial counsel had brought such

a requirement to the attention of the trial court in a pre-trial
Motion in Limine (R. 33-38), Young's counsel at trial failed to
even raise the issue when the trial court was considering
admission of Hales' testimony for purposes of "opportunity" under
Rule 404(b).

Moreover, trial counsel never objected to the scope

of Hale's testimony but allowed her to testify as to the
commission of another forgery by Young rather than simply that
she had seen Young in possession with a check from the same
account as that used in the forgery at Albertson's.
In addition, Young's trial counsel never requested that the
trial court give the jury a limiting instruction under Rule 105
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule 105 states, "When evidence

is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
17

admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to
its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."
In relation to this issue, the Utah Supreme Court, on more
than one occasion has concluded that it is error for the trial
court to refuse a defendant's request for such an instruction
with respect to evidence of a prior criminal act.

State v.

Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987); State v. Smith, 700
P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985).

In fact, the court in Johnson

stated, "[A]dmission of evidence of other crimes creates such a
great likelihood of prejudice... that the defendant is entitled
upon request to an instruction that the evidence may be
considered only for the limited purposes for which it is
specifically offered."

Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1075.

Therefore,

Young asserts that if it is unreasonable and erroneous for the
trial court not to grant such a limiting instruction, it is
likewise deficient performance for trial counsel not to request
such an instruction.
B.

Absent Counsel's Deficient Performance a Reasonable
Likelihood of a More Favorable Result for Young Existed

The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by
showing there is a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.

A reasonable probability has been described as

"a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the
outcome."

See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068;

Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466; Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1089.

"The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
18

whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result."

Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1092.

In this particular case the adversarial process cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.

Trial counsel has an

obligation to know the law and to understand its applicability to
each case he undertakes.

Young asserts that had trial counsel

known the Utah Rules of Evidence, and had he understood the
status of the law surrounding the application of the Utah Rules
of Evidence with respect to prior criminal or bad acts, there was
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result.

Young

further asserts that, for the same reasons the trial court's
error was harmful, his trial counsel's deficiencies were likewise
prejudicial, and therefore, this Court's confidence in the
verdict must be undermined.

Accordingly, Young asks this Court

to vacate his conviction because he was denied his constitutional
right to effective counsel.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing reasons, because of the trial
court's error in admitting prejudicial testimony of a prior
criminal act, and because of trial court's ineffectiveness, this
Court should vacate Young's conviction and remand the case for a
new trial.
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DATED this

z.
^T

day of February, 1996

Plji^yL^^
Attorney for Young

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant this
of February, 1996, to the following:

Jan Graham, Utah Attorney

General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114.

/

20

day

^Cl^^y^UlA^~c^l--?y*'C&+~\*

Tabl

-V fi'3!/

0MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE

vs.

Case No. 941400580

CLINT D. YOUNG,

Judge Boyd L. Park

Defendant.
The Defendant, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, submits the following memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine addressing admissibility of
evidence potentially presented by the prosecution.
ARGUMENT
RULES 403 AND 404
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
Even if evidence of prior crimes or bad acts meets the requirements of
Rule 404(b), Rule 403 provides that such evidence:

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is not
admissible, unless, the evidence is presented to show motive, intent
opportunity etc.

Nevertheless, even if the evidence meets the

requirements of Rule 404(b), that evidence must be excluded if it
violates Rule 403.
RULE 609
Under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and its case law
this court should disallow any evidence of prior or subsequent crimes
in order to attack the credibility of the accused.

Rule 609 provides

"evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be
admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused . . . "
In interpreting the rule, the court in

State v. Saunders, 699

P.2d 738 (Utah 1985)/ said "Evidence of prior crimes is presumed
prejudicial. . . . " The Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City v. Holtman,
806 P.2d 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) stated "Trial court's admission of a
prior conviction because it was 'of sufficient probative value' was
improper because this rule requires the trial court to balance the
probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect."
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials
at Common Law section 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983) declared:
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The general rule prohibiting evidence that a defendant
committed other crimes was established, not because that
evidence is logically irrelevant, but because it tends to
skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process.
Indeed, Dean Wigmore has argued, 'It is objectionable not
because it has no appreciable probative value but because it
has too much.'" State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988).
The court continued:
Thus evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible
unless it tends to have a special relevance to a
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other
than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality.
Citations omitted.
Even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a particular
element of a crime and is not offered merely to show criminal
predisposition, such evidence is not automatically admissible
under Rule 404 (b). Citations omitted.
Defendant asserts that the reason for making the admissibility of
another criminal conviction so difficult is in deference to the
defendant's constitutional rights. The Utah Constitution provides as
follows:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial . . . . Utah Constitution Article I, section
12.
Clearly in order for the other conviction to be admissible if
Defendant elects to testify the court must, under rule 609, begin with
the presumption that such information is more prejudicial than
probative, and then the court must find that "the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused."

In reaching this determination the court may not admit the

evidence "to show criminal disposition" under the Saunders decision.
The decision goes on to outline the factors to be considered in the
balancing the admissibility of the conviction.

In the estimation of

the defense, none of the factors argue in favor of admissibility.
Factor numbered 5 argues clearly for the non admissibility of the
other convictions. That factor reads; "The importance of the accused's
testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions
probative of the accused's character for veracity." In this case the
prejudicial effect of the defendant's not testifying may be
insurmountable.

The danger that the jury will be prejudiced by the

defendant not taking the witness stand in this case, despite
cautionary instructions are far to great.

Additionally the other

conviction does not even go to the accused's character for veracity.
CONCLUSION
Under the tests of Rules 403, 404 and 609 the evidence of other
convictions should be ruled inadmissible in this case.
DATED this

day of November,

Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendant's Motion in Limine to C. Kay Bryson, Utah Cpunty Attorney,
100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this &^ $ay of
November, 1994.
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MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO LIMIT ADMISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 941400580

CLINT D. YOUNG,
Judge Boyd L. Park
Defendant.
The Defendant, CLINT D. YOUNG, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and based upon the accompanying Memorandum
of Points and Authorities here moves the court to limit evidence
potentially submitted by the prosecution.
Defendant moves to limit any prior criminal history or bad acts
of the defendant, Clint D. Young.
Dated this

day of November, 1994

11
Michael E . Jep£]
Defendant
Attorney ffor Dei

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing motion, postage prepaid to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center,
Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ~7 day of November, 1994.
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JOHN L. ALLAN
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026
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CARMA B. SMITh" Clurb

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
LIMIT ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,

vs.
CUNT D. YOUNG,

Judge Boyd L. Park
Defendant.
Case No. 941400580

The State, by and through Counsel, John L. Allan, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, submits the following memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Limit Admissibility of Evidence.
FACTS
1. On May 10, 1994, the Defendant, Clint D. Young, cashed a check from "Circle
A Outfitters" for $396.69 at an Albertson's store in Orem City ("the Store"). The
check was written to the Defendant's order and was endorsed by the Defendant.
2. The check was signed with the names "John Norris" and "Stacy Fairchild."
3. Prior to the Store's clerk cashing the check, the Defendant, upon request,
produced his Utah drivers license. The clerk checked the number written on the
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Memorandum in Opposition
Page - 2 -

check and verified that it matched the number on the driver's license.
4. The clerk also verified that the person cashing the check matched the picture on
the driver's license produced.
5. Later, the check was rejected by the bank and was returned to the Store.
6. The checking account from which the check was written, Circle A Outfitters
("Circle A"), was opened with Draper Bank & Trust on April 4, 1988 and closed on
August 8, 1989.
7. Those authorized to sign the checks during this period were John S. Norris and
Ronald Murdock.
8. Mr. John S. Norris died on October 1, 1993.
9. After investigation, a warrant for the Defendant's arrest was issued and the
Defendant was arrested. The Defendant is now charged with forgery, a second
degree felony.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE PRIOR CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO
RULE 609 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE IS PREMATURE
The defendant argues that the State should not be allowed to use prior convictions to
impeach the defendant pursuant to Rule 609 and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
As the court is obviously aware, these issues are very fact sensitive and the State contends
that such a decision could not fairly and accurately be made until the time of trial.
Most of the defendant's current criminal history involves misdemeanor offenses.
However, the defendant has other forgery charges pending against him. The State is
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Memorandum in Opposition
Page - 3 -

unaware of whether the defendant will testify. If he chooses to do so, depending on his
testimony, those possible convictions could become relevant for impeachment reasons, as
well as being highly probative. However, those decisions could only be properly addressed
at that time. Therefore, the State requests that a decision in this matter not be made until the
time of trial.
H. EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S OTHER CRIMES. WRONGS. OR ACTS IS
PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
A. Rule 404.
The Defendant explains that under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
evidence of the other crimes, wrongs or acts ("prior bad acts") is not admissible to prove the
Defendants propensity for criminality. Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible, however,
for other purposes (e.g., proof of identity, knowledge, or intent). See U.R.E. 404. The
Defendant further explains that even though a prior bad act may be admissible under Rule
404(b), it may ultimately be excluded under Rule 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .
. . ."). The State concurs in the Defendant's statement of the law.
Beyond merely providing an exposition of the law, however, the Defendant has
neither identified any particular prior bad acts nor articulated any reason for keeping these
prior bad acts out of evidence. Consequently, the State can only guess as to what evidence
the Defendant is asking the court to exclude and, more importantly, on what basis the
Defendant feels this evidence should be excluded.
Most likely, the Defendant is inferring from this exposition that the numerous prior

Memorandum in Opposition
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and subsequent incidences in which the Defendant forged checks from the Circle A account
are inadmissible in the present case. The State, however, asserts that some, if not all, of
these incidence are admissible to establish the following elements in the present case: (1)
that the Defendant was the person who forged and passed the Circle A check, (2) that the
Defendant had knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the Circle A check, and (3) that the
Defendant forged and passed the Circle A check with intent. In other words, the State
believes that this evidence should be allowed in order to establish the elements of identity,
knowledge and intent.
"Prior bad act evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being offered is to
prove bad character or to show that a person acted in conformity with that character." State
v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis in original). Thus, prior bad act
evidence is properly admitted "'when relevant to prove some material fact including absence
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or
identity.'" State v. Featherstone. 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Shaffer.
725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). "When evidence may establish
constitutive elements of the crime of which the defendant is accused, in the case on trial, it is
admissible even though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other crimes."
Featherstone. 781 P.2d at 426 (citing State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960 (Utah (1989) and
cases cited therein; and State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) (evidence of
other crimes was probative and necessary to prove identity of defendant); State v. Smith,
700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (in prosecution for rape, forcible sodomy, and burglary,

Memorandum in Opposition
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the evidence of a prior criminal act to prove identity was admissible but subject to a limiting
instruction)).
In the present case, if the Defendant contests either the element of identity,
knowledge or intent, the State maintains that it should be allowed to rebut the defense's
assertions by presenting evidence of other relevant incidences in which the Defendant has
forged checks from the Circle A account. Such evidence would be necessary to rebut the
defense's claims and would be highly probative on these material issues. See Johnson.
supra, at 1075 (evidence of other crimes is properly admitted "when it is reasonably
necessary and highly probative of a material issue").
At this time, the State is aware of one incident in particular. This incident occurred
at Triple G Foods in West Valley City, Utah. There, the Defendant presented a Circle A
check to a checker who happened to be acquainted with the Defendant? Unknowingly, she
accepted the check assuming it had the defendant's name and identification on it. She more
closely looked at the check at a later time and realized the defendant had represented himself
as Doug Renterio. The clerk immediately realized there was a problem with the check since
the passer had signed a false name.
This incident is highly probative on the elements of identity, knowledge and intent in
the matter before the court. In the present case, the Defendant passed a Circle A check with
the bogus signatures of "John Norris" and "Stacy Fairchild." The defendant endorsed the
back of the check with his own name, Clint Young.

At Triple G Foods, the Defendant also

passed a Circle A check, however, the defendant represented himself as Doug Renterio. This

Memorandum in Opposition
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incident shows not only identity in the present case but also shows that the Defendant had
knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the Circle A check and that he had intent to pass the
fraudulent check. Sfig Johnson, supra, at 1074 (at a trial for forgery, the trial court allowed
testimony from a clerk at a separate forgery on the ground "that the issue of the defendant's
identity was in dispute, and [the clerk's] testimony, even though of another crime, was
highly probative since other identity evidence was somewhat uncertain"). The State,
therefore, maintains that this evidence should be allowed into evidence in the present case.
B. Rule 403.
The Defendant intimates that under Rule 403 all of the Defendant's other incidences
of forgery should be excluded from evidence in the present case. The State, however,
refutes this argument and maintains that these incidences, at least with regard to those
mentioned above, are properly admissible in the present case.
Under Rule 403, evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." U.R.E 403 (emphasis added). Whether the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a "fact-intensive question." State v. Morrell.
803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990). "'[S]tanding alone, the fact that the evidence may be
prejudicial to defendant does not necessarily render the evidence incompetent . . .

If

evidence is prejudicial but is at least equally probative of a critical fact, it is properly
admissible/" CTNeil. supra, at 701 (quoting State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App.

Memorandum in Opposition
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1991)).
In State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court listed
several factors that a court may consider in balancing the probativeness and the prejudice.
These factors include "the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime,
the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof and the degree to which the
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id. at 295-96. Under
these factors, admitting the prior bad act evidence would be proper. There is strong
evidence of the Defendant's guilt in the Triple G Foods incident; the clerk is a competent eye
witness who is acquainted with the Defendant. Qt MorrelL supra, at 296 (strong evidence
of defendant's guilt in view of competent eyewitness testimony). The period of time between
the incidence is less than three weeks. Cf. O'NeiL supra, at 701 (three years) and MorrelL
supra, at 296 (within months). Further, if the Defendant contests either the element of
identity, knowledge or intent in the present case, the evidence would be necessary to rebut
the defense's claims and would be highly probative on these material issues. CL Shickles.
supra, at 296 (even where "other evidences of defendant's intent" are introduced, "the use of
. . . other-crimes evidence" is "not necessarily" precluded); see also O'Neil. supra, at 701
(quoting Shickles with approval and applying to case's facts). Lastly, this evidence would
not rouse the jury to "overmastering hostility," and to avoid the probability of this, the court
could emphasize to the jury the reason for the evidence's admission. See Smith, supra
(evidence of other crimes necessary to prove identity and was admissible but subject to a

Memorandum in Opposition
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(evidence of other crimes necessary to prove identity and was admissible but subject to a
limiting instruction); sgg al5Q, O'Neil. supra, at 701 and Morrell. supra, at 296 (even
though prejudicial, the evidence was extremely probative of material issue).

CONCLUSION
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, prior bad act evidence is admissible to prove
identity, knowledge or intent, as well as other material facts. In the present case, the
Defendant's prior and subsequent acts of forgery, which establish identity, knowledge or
intent, are therefore properly admissible into evidence. Furthermore, under the factors put
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Shickles. this evidence should not be excluded under
Rule 403. Therefore, the State respectfully moves that this court deny the Defendant's
Motion to Limit Admissibility of Evidence in conformance with this memorandum.

DATED this

/$

day of November, 1994.
CARLYLE K. BRYSON
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY

J0&NL. ALLAN
/DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
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Fourth Judicial Oistrlet Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT4£
COURT

B. SMrm.ciark
Dtputy

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 941400580
DATE: January 3, 1995

vs.

JUDGE: BOYD L. PARK

CLINT D. YOUNG

CLERK: NAH

Defendant.

This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Limit Admissibility of
of Evidence. The Court has read the memorandum in support of and in opposition to said
motion and being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings and conclusions.
1. Defendant's motion is a shotgun approach to the supposed evidence to be
produced at time of trial.
2. Rules 403, 404 and 609 are fact sensitive, with certain discretion in the trial
court.
3. This court is without sufficient information to make a ruling at the present time.
4. The court will refrain from a general ruling at this time and consider at the time
of trial the objections of counsel for the defendant.
5. Plaintiffs counsel should not inquire into other crimes, wrongs or bad acts of
the defendant at the time of trial without first acquiring the court's permission to do so.
6. The Court can more appropriately make its decision regarding what evidence
should be allowed at the time of trial.
7. Defendant's Motion in Limine will be considered at the time of trial, outside of
the presence and hearing of the jury and before counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into
areas covered by rules 403, 404, and 609.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 3rd day of h

JUDGE BOYD L. PARK
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MR. ALLAN:

Judge —

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. ALLAN:

The motion —

or what I would be

4

asking is that I be allowed to call Holly Hales.

I

5

planned her as a rebuttal witness.

6

don't know as though the defense is going to call the

7

defendant or not.

8

statements through, they have attacked the identity of the

9

defendant being the one who passed the check.

My only concern is I

I believe, however, from opening

As I've

10

indicated in a previous motion, Holly Hales received a

11

check on the exact same account, which she received from

12

the defendant, because she knows him from high school.

13

She went to —

14

years, knew him specifically.

15

May 20th ~

16

days after this check was passed.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

with this gentleman to high school for

is that correct?

And the check was passed on
I think it was May 20th, 19

THE COURT: Well, we really ~
THE DEFENDANT: All I had to do was go to the
restroom.
THE COURT:

We really need to have the

defendant present if you're going to argue this.
MR. CUNDICK:

Would you briefly summarize what

you just said?

24

MR. ALLAN:

Yes. What I was indicating was —

25

THE COURT:

Well, if we're going to have a
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motion, I might as well sit down.
MR. ALLAN:

Okay.

Based on the

cross-examination and the defendant's opening statement,
the attack is on identity of the suspect as being the one
who went in Albertson's and cashed the check.

What I'm

indicating is that we have another witness here who
received a check, exactly the same account, Circle A
H

Outfitters, the same account number, for $150.

She

received that at GGG Foods in West Valley, Utah, 19 days
after this check was received at Albertson's in Orem.

She

will testify that she grew up and knows the defendant,
that he went to school with her, and, in fact, lives very
near by her, and that he came in and actually passed the
check.

She will also testify that the signature on the

check is Doug Brentario.
She at her position was asked to go ahead and
accept the check.

She saw the defendant, had even

conversed with him, and simply went ahead and marked her
initials on it, not looking at the name.

But later she

was questioned about the document because it was returned
again as a forgery.

And when she looked down, she

realized that she had been duped into believing or —

into

not looking at the signature, because she actually knew
the defendant.

But she will testify she absolutely knows

that Clint Young was the one who came in and passed it to
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1

her.

2

The reason I think it should be admitted into

3

court under prior bad acts, Rules of Evidence, Rule 404,

4

indicates other —

5

on Page 558 —

6

acts*

7

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to

8

show action and conformity therewith.

9

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

and I'm reading from Paragraph B, it's

558 is the page.

"Other crimes, wrongs, or

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

It may, however, be

10

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

11

identity, or absence of mistake or accident."

12

believe the defendant has raised the issue of identity.

13

And I

I'm not trying to put the evidence in to prove

14

that because he passed that check up there, he passed this

15

one here.

16

that account.

17

passed to —

18

West Valley.

19

issue of identity, whether these individuals who had taken

20

the stand have correctly identified the defendant as being

21

the person to pass the check.

But I think it does indicate he had access to
He had checks just like the one that he

in this case, he passed to Holly Hales in
And I believe it specifically goes to the

22

THE COURT:

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24
25

bench?

Mr. Cundick?
Your Honor, can I approach the

With all due respect, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

No.

You have to do whatever you
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1

(inaudible) tells you to do.

2

THE DEFENDANT:

I want the judge to see this.

3

And something done.

4

outside world here to see what — i f you're trying to

5

waiver the jury, I mean it's —

6
7

MR. CUNDICK:
people

10

The defendant wants some other

THE DEFENDANT:
here.

—

all said —

And there is no one here. And my dad can't come

in.

13

should be open to the public.

And he's waiting outside there.

14

MR. ALLAN:

15

talking about people?
THE DEFENDANT:

17

MR. CUNDICK:

Just general public.

The general public's welcome to,

Clint, but not your father, because he's going to testify.

19

THE DEFENDANT:

I know that.

He can sit out

there.

21

23

And the courtroom

Are you talking about witnesses, or

16

22

They

and there's a lot of people that's supposed to

12

20

that I've asked to come

And why they aren't here is unexplainable.

11 II be here.

18

And I'll have the

—

8
9

That is my rights.

MR. CUNDICK:

Okay.

Yes, they're welcome to

come in.
THE DEFENDANT:

Okay.

Then I want a recess to

24

call and have just a bunch of people that I know just sit

25

back and see what's going on.
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1

MR. ALLAN:

I don't want to delay the

2

proceedings so he can have his family come in the

3

courtroom.

4

THE DEFENDANT:

But I think

5

that'8 fair.

6

trying to waiver the jury talking them into it, I think

7

it's fair, (inaudible).

8
9

Beings that you're up there

THE COURT: Well, if they're here, they can
come in.

10
11

Don't you?

I don't either.

If they're not here —
THE DEFENDANT:

Sure.

I'll go off the street

and get some people to come sit in here.

12

MR. CUNDICK:

All of this is being recorded.

13

There's a video that's being made of all of this.

So it's

14

not like this is a secret proceeding or anything.

You

15

know, you're certainly welcome to have everyone come in.

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

MR. CUNDICK:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

MR. CUNDICK:

20

23

I'm sorry?
Nothing.
I don't know quite how to

respond•

21
22

Tapes can be changed.

THE DEFENDANT:

I'm not going to say nothing no

more.
THE COURT:

Well, if there's anybody out there

24

that's here to support him or whatever, let them come in,

25

as long as they're not witnesses.
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THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

stay out.

That's all I ask, Your Honor.

There's no reason why they should

Nobody's told them to stay out.

4

THE DEFENDANT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Could

5

we have just a brief recess, maybe 20 minutes, to find out

6

where Holly went?

7

left?

She's not going to be a witness.

8

this.

She was railroaded out.

9
10

Why her ex-husband stayed here and she

THE COURT:

She wants to see

Apparently, if she's the one I was

thinking of, she was having a coughing spell and left.

11

THE DEFENDANT:

Well, I know, but —

she'll be

12

all right, if I can get a hold of her, Your Honor.

13

me.

14
15

THE COURT:
proceedings

Trust

Well, I'm not going to delay the

—

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

—

Okay.

That's fine.

for that particular purpose.
If anything —

(inaudible).

You're certainly welcome to come in

20

and come back.

21

with this, another 10-minute recess probably, for our

22

sake, and then you can do whatever you want to do during

23

that period of time.

24
25

We will take a recess when we get through

THE DEFENDANT:

Okay.

And if anything, I'll

discredit my dad and have him come in here, and he won't
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1

testify, and just to see what

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

n

—

Well, whatever.

It's your call.

Okay.

Mr. Cundick, do you want to respond

to this?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

If you want, we can wait five

7

minutes, and I could have her back up here, or whatever

8

you want.

It's —

9
10

THE COURT:

Well, (inaudible).

I want to get

over this part.

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

I don't want to just

—

I want to get over this

13

(inaudible), then you'll have ten minutes to do whatever

14

you want to do.

15

THE DEFENDANT:

I've been in jail for six

16

months for something I didn't do.

17

innocent until proven guilty.

18

Six months from my kids. My little girl had to go to

19

counseling.

20

THE COURT:

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

little boy.

I always thought it was

Not the other way around.

Well —
It hurt my little girl.

That's what I'm pissed off about.

23

THE COURT:

Mr. Cundick?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

Do you want to respond to

My
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1 II M r . Allan'8 request?
2

MR. CUNDICK:

Your Honor, the general rule is

3

that this type of evidence is not admissible.

And the

4

prosecutor has to find some sort of exception to —

5

burden is under him to find some exception.

6

instance he's trying to come in under 404-B saying it's

7

for identity.

8

relationship between this crime and what happened in West

9

Valley City.

the

In this

However, in this case, there is no

I mean, it wasn't even the same modus

10

operandi.

11

that she'll say was Clint Young that presented a different

12

driver's license to get a check cashed.

13

In that case, you had somebody presenting

—

That's entirely different than what happened

14

here.

15

used Clint Young's driver's license, that signed it Clint

16
17

II

Young.

And in this case, we have somebody coming in that

And they're having a handwriting expert to come

and testify that, yes, these are the same two.

18

That's an entirely different fact situation

19

from that in West Valley City.

I don't see where it would

20

really help on identity, except to say, yeah, there may or

21

may not have been another crime that occurred in West

22

Valley City, and it involved this particular person.

23

They're not close enough.

24

close enough to warrant admissibility of that in this

25

courtroom.

Their fact situation isn't
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1

THE COURT:

If I understand what Mr. Allan is

2

saying, it's the same series of checks that were being

3

presented, same account.

4

numbered or not.

5

the same checks are identical on the printed face of the

6

checks.

7
8

But at least the same account number,

MR. ALLAN:

I could show the court the

comparison of the check in question here and the check —

9
10

I don't know whether they're

MR. CUNDICK:

If I could —

both examine them and see what we're looking at.

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

MR. CUNDICK:

13

If we could just

(inaudible) ought to go around.
If I could just show them to the

defendant.

14

THE COURT: Yes.

15

(Off-record discussion at counsel table.)

16

THE DEFENDANT:

I'd just like a brief recess so

17

I could call, go out (inaudible) before she leaves, and

18

then I have to call her at home just so she can come in

19

and sit and see what's going on.

20

Uncle Jerry is outside.

21

right downstairs, get him, five seconds, and be back.

22

dad's twin brother.

23

him.

That's all I ask.

He's not a witness.

My

I can walk
My

Got a twin brother that came with

24

MR. ALLAN:

25

MR. CUNDICK:

Let's finish the motion.
If we could have one moment with
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2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

jury is back?

4

lawyer.

5
6

Could I walk out just until the

Since I don't need to be here.

MR. CUNDICK:

You're my

The defendant is requesting this.

Can we let him go do that while we're arguing this motion?

7

MR. ALLAN:

I want him leaving on the record

8

that he doesn't want to be attending while this motion is

9

being heard, because obviously he has the right to be

10

here.

11
12

THE DEFENDANT:
the jury isn't.

13
14

I don't have to be here when

MR. CUNDICK:

Do you want to be here while

we're arguing this motion?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

No, Your Honor.

I would like

16

to go out and —

can I be excused for, say, 15 minutes

17

while I just run downstairs, get my dad's twin brother?

18

My dad'8 testifying, not his twin brother, either, or vice

19

versa.

20

I'm not going nowhere.

And then I'll be right up when the jury is here.

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

MR. ALLAN:

24
25

All right.

Go ahead.

Thank you, Your Honor.

You specifically understand that

we're not —
THE DEFENDANT:

Very much, Your Honor.
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1

MR, ALLAN:

Mr. Young?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

MR. ALLAN:

What's that?

You specifically understand that

4

you're an important part of the proceeding, and you're

5

choosing not to be here?

6
7

THE DEFENDANT:

not had an important part in this whole matter, sir.

8 ||
9

MR. ALLAN:

I just want to make it clear for

the record.

10
11

MR. CUNDICK:
best interest.

I trust my lawyer to do in my

Thank you.

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

I am just stating that I have

Okay.
That's why he's a defense

lawyer.

15

(Defendant no longer present in proceedings.)

16

MR. CUNDICK:

17

THE COURT:

19

MR. CUNDICK:

The checks are

—

The checks are the same check, it

looks like.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. CUNDICK:

23

Your Honor, if you see,

it's —

18

20

Okay.

The same series of checks.
The same series of checks.

But

one —

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. CUNDICK:

Everything was identical.
Right.

And one was done in an
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entirely different manner.

2

these —

3

are they on the account?

4

account.

One was done trying to use

these two signatures, and signatures that are —
Well, one of them was on the

5

MR. ALLAN:

One of them was on the account.

6

MR. CUNDICK:

7

in and writes a check and signs it.

8

Clint Young driver's license provided on this one, or

9

anything of that nature.

And this one, somebody just comes
I mean, there was no

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

11

MR. ALLAN:

Judge, just for clarification.

She

12

will testify that the driver's license she received had

13

Clint Young's picture on it that was in question.

14

somehow he apparently made a false ID.

15

even look at the signature because she knew the gentleman

16

before her, so she just okayed the check.

17
18

MR. CUNDICK:

But she didn't

Does that driver's license match

Clint's?

19
20

But

MR. ALLAN:
so —

No.

but the real question

It matches Doug Brentario
—

21

THE COURT:

And where did she work?

22

MR. ALLAN:

At GGG Foods in West Valley.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. ALLAN:

Uh-huh.

25

(inaudible)
The real question in my

opinion here is how does Clint Young come in contact with
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He really has no tie to Circle A

2

Outfitters' account.

3

identity.

4
5

And so there is an issue here of

THE COURT:

Well, identity.

But it's more than

that perhaps is opportunity.

6

MR. ALLAN:

Uh-huh.

7

THE COURT:

That he certainly has had an

8

opportunity to have these checks. And I think for that

9

purpose I will allow her to testify.

And then the jury

10

can give it whatever weight it wants. And argue whatever

11

you want, but the opportunity is there if he had those

12

checks in his hands, at least that one check in his hand,

13

and that can be definitely identified as being him.

14

there's an opportunity to get to these checks of which an

15

account had already been closed.

16

the exception.

17

MR. CUNDICK:

18

MR. ALLAN:

19

MR. CUNDICK:

20

MR. ALLAN:

21

THE COURT: Yes.

22

(Off record.)

23

(In open court.)

24

THE CLERK:

25

So

I think that's part of

Yes, sir.

Thank you, Judge.
Can we go off the record?

Can we go off the record?

This court is again in session.

The Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding.

Please be seated.

Tab 5
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1
2

THE COURT:

You don't have any objections to

that, do you?

3

MR, CUNDICK:

4

THE COURT:

5

then we can possibly get it back.

6

substitute it for the evidence.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

No, I don't have an objection.
If you want to appeal anything,

MR. CUNDICK:

But we'll allow you to

(inaudible) original, then we're

going to substitute the original with a photocopy.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. CUNDICK:

If I need it back for any purpose

(inaudible).
Then GGG is turning it over to West

MR. ALLAN:

Valley PD, so they should have it in their evidence so —
THE COURT:

Unless you get it tied up in two

15

cases, and even then I think an order of the court can get

16

it out for purpose of examination on the panel.

17

MR. CUNDICK:

Thanks.

18

(In open court.)

19

—oOo—

20

HOLLY HALES

21

having been sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth,

22

and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:

23

—oOo—

24
25

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ALLAN:
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1

Q.

Can I call you Holly?

2 II

A .

Yeah.

3

Q.

Holly, can you please state your full name for

4

the court?

5

A.

It's Holly Hales.

6

Q.

And in what city do you reside right now?

7

A.

West Valley City.

8

Q.

And where are you currently working at at this

9

point of time?

10

A.

At O.C. Tanner Company.

11

Q.

Have you been working there for a long period

12

of time?

13

A.

14

weeks.

15

Q.

16

I just recently returned there for about two
I
And let me ask you, back on May 20th of 1994,

do you recall where you were working there?

17

A.

At GGG.

18

Q.

GGG?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And where is it located at?

21

A.

On 41 South and 4000 West.

22

Q.

In what city?

23

A.

West Valley City.

24

Q.

Thank you.

25

Foods?

That's a grocery store.

And what was your position at GGG
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A.

I was the manager there.

Q.

Being a manager, were you ever asked to accept

or to okay the acceptance of checks?
A.

Yeah.

That was one of my jobs.

Q.

Let me show you what has been marked as State's

Exhibit 10 for identification.
that check.

I'll ask you to examine

Have you ever seen that check before?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And how do you know that you've seen it?

A.

Because my initials are on it.

Q.

Okay.

When your initials are on it, what does

that mean?
A.

I —

my initials have to be on there.

It's

saying that I okayed the check.
Q.

And again, that is part of your job is to okay

the check?
A.

Right.

Q.

Were you the one —

did you work as a cashier

at that store?
A.

No.

Q.

Were you the one who was actually cashing this

check, or were you just asked to approve the cashing of
it?
A.

Yeah.

Q«

Do you recall this incident, that check in
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1

particular?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And why is it that you recall it?

4

A.

Because I knew Clint.

5

with him.

Well, I've —

I went to high school

basically he lived close by me.

6

Q.

Clint?

7

A.

Yeah.

8

Q.

Who —

9

A.

Clint Young.

10

Q.

And you know Clint Young?

11

A.

Yeah.

12

Q.

He went to high school with you?

13

A.

Well, elementary and junior high school.

14

Clint who?

And I

didn't see much of him in high school.

15

Q.

But you also indicated that he lived by you?

16

A.

Uh-huh.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Maybe two blocks.

19

Q.

Are you familiar with his family?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Was Clint in the same grade as you?

22

A.

Yeah.

23

Q.

Would you know him on a first-name basis?

24

A.

Right.

25

Q.

And is Clint Young in the courtroom today?

How close are we talking?

Well, yeah.

Blocks or —

His brother and his sister.
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1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

Can you point him out to us?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

When you say "that's," you'll have to tell us.

5

Describe —

6

A.

7

That'8 Clint.

That's Clint Young.

And I like him.

always been nice to me so —

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

The gentleman in the black.

10

Q.

Black shirt?

11

A.

Right.

12

Q.

Seated in the middle?
May the record indicate she's

pointed out the defendant.
THE COURT:

15
16

Q.

17

that check?

The record may so reflect.

BY MR. ALLAN:

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

Which one are you referring to?

MR. ALLAN:

13
14

Holly, did Clint Young give you

And now, if you look on the bottom of

the check, how is the check signed?

21

A.

Doug —

22

Q.

First (inaudible)

23

A.

It's Doug Brentaria or Brentario.

24
25

He's

I was.

I'm not sure

on the spelling.
Q.

And you accepted that check from Clint Young
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1 II with the signature of Doug Brentario?
2

A.

Yeah.

The check was already signed when I

3

approved it.

And all I did —

4

already written the driver's license down with the

5

expiration date. And I just basically checked the zip

6

code for the area and the date that the checking account

7

was open.

And so with —

8 11 I did see the license.
9

And

see, the cashier had

the license was still out.

And

And I was talking with him.

—

10

Q.

When you say -him/- who are you referring to?

11

A.

With Clint Young.

I was talking with him.

And

12

so I didn't even look to see that the name wasn't signed.

13

So that was —

14

Q.

The name of Clint Young?

15

A.

Right.

16

Q.

So Clint Young was presenting this check

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

—

19

Wasn't on the check.
—

and you accepted it, but you really didn't

even look at the signature on the check?

20

A.

Right.

21

Q.

Are you sure it was Clint that was passing the

22

check?

23

A.

Yeah.

24

Q.

And was he buying groceries, or do you know?

25

A.

I can't remember that.
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Q.

What was the value —

A.

All I did was okay the check.

Q.

All you did was okay the check?

A.

Right.

Q.

What was the value on the check?

A.

$150.

There was also another manager in the

store that took one for, I believe —
Q.

Okay.

Let's just talk about this one.

What

account is that check written on?
A.

What account?

Q.

Yes.

A.

You mean the branch of the bank?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Draper Bank.

Q.

Does it show who the check comes from up in the

Branch of the bank?

left-hand corner where you see —
A.

Circle A Outfitters.

Q.

Circle A Outfitters?

A.

Right.

Q.

Did you ever run into problems with this check

Outfitter.

later?
22 II

A.

Yeah.

It was returned to the store.

23

boss threatened to —

24

so —

25

Q.

well, I did.

And my

I lost my job over it,

You lost your job over accepting this check?
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A.

Well, yeah.

2

Q.

Did he question you why you didn't look at the

3

—

name of the check?

4

A.

5

the check.

6

Q.

7

And

Yeah.

And I said that's how come I remembered

I said, well, it was a friend of mine.
So what you're telling us is you accepted that

check without looking at the name?

8

A.

Right.

9

Q.

Did you have any further contact with the

10

defendant after you received this check?

11

A.

Yeah.

12

Q.

What happened?

13

A.

He called and apologized and said that he was

14

sorry that that had happened.

15

said that he wanted to get the check back, maybe for

16

payment, make payment on the check.

17

get it because my boss had it.

18

It was in the safe.

19
20

Q.

It was out of my hands.

Is that what you're saying?

MR. ALLAN:

22

like to —

23

foundation.

24

Q.

25

And I said I couldn't

So he called you back and wanted to pay for the

check (inaudible)?

21

And he was very nice and

Okay.

Your Honor, at this time I would

well, first of all, let me lay one more

BY MR. ALLAN:

on that check?

What is the date that appears
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1

A.

May 20th.

2

Q.

To the best of your recollection, would that be

3

the approximate time it was passed?

4

A.

Right.

5

Q.

And did you make any other notes?

You've

6

indicated that your initials appear on the check.

7

make any other notes on the check?

8
9

A.

Did you

Just I circled the date that the checking

account was opened, and the zip code.

10

Q.

Has the check to your knowledge been altered?

11

A.

The checking account was open and the zip code.

12

Q.

Has the check to your knowledge been altered in

13
14

any way from the date you received it to now?
A.

I don't know that —

the only thing that I

15

didn't really notice on the check was the upper left-hand

16

corner.

17

mean —

It says 8 dash 89.

I don't know what that is. I

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

I don't remember seeing that on the check.

20

Q.

And there probably is another document —

or

21

another item stamped on the check, "account closed," or

22

something of that nature after it went through the bank;

23

is that correct?

24
25

A.

On the back side, maybe.

front side, no.

It's not on this
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2

Q.

But the check did come back to the business; is

that correct?

3

A.

Right.

4

Q.

And it was not honored by the bank?

5

A.

Unh-unh.

6

MR. ALLAN:

Your Honor, at this time I'd like

7

to submit State's Exhibit 10 —

8

into evidence.

9

THE COURT:
MR. CUNDICK:

11

previous oral argument.

13

yeah, 10,

Objections?

10

12

or excuse me —

THE COURT:

Just objections as outlined in my

Okay.

The court will receive

Exhibit 10.

14

(State's Exhibit 10 received into

15

evidence.)

16

MR. ALLAN:

Your Honor, at this time while it's

17

fresh on the jury's mind, I would like to allow the

18

jury —

19

Exhibit 1 so that they can examine both documents.

20

or pass around State's Exhibit 10 and State's

MR. CUNDICK:

21

it in the jury room.

22

now, that's fine.

23

MR. ALLAN:

Your Honor, they'll be able to do

But, I don't —

if he wants to do it

I understand that.

I simply want

24

to do it while the testimony is fresh on their memory

25

about has occurred.

211
1 II

THE COURT:

2

jury room.

3

moment.

Well, I think they can do it at the

If counsel will approach the bench for a

4

(At the bench.)

5

THE COURT:

I only want this check in for the

6

purposes of opportunity.

And I don't want it to

7

(inaudible) to commit a crime committed somewhere else

8

(inaudible).

9

and let them make a comparison there (inaudible).

I'm going to have this go to the jury room

10

want it to go any further.

11

have probably stopped you quicker on a couple of

12

questions, but

As a matter of fact, I would

—

13

MR. ALLAN:

My only argument in closing

14

THE COURT:

But it's okay.

15

MR. ALLAN:

17

(In open court.)

18

MR. ALLAN:

19

witness at this time.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

I have no further questions of the

You may cross-examine.
—oOo—

22

CROSS EXAMINATION

25

Let's let them

That's fine.

21

24

—

examine it in the jury room.

16

23

I don't

BY MR. CUNDICK:
Q.

Now, Holly, you just have knowledge of this

particular check, correct?

